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Prevention and Sovereignty: AVision and a
Strategy for a New World Order?
WOLF-DIETER EBERWEIN and BERTRAND BADIE1
Prevention has become one of the declared objectives by national governments, the
United Nations and the European Union to end violent conflict in the short term and
to eradicate the causes of violent conflict in the longer run. Prevention defined as a com-
prehensive strategy includes the use of force through intervention if necessary. The
article discusses first the relationship between prevention and intervention and their
linkage to the international order. The abolition of inter-state war was the declared
goal of the Charter of the UN. Today, the aim seems to include the abolition of internal
war as well which implies a redefinition both of internal sovereignty and the non-
intervention principle. During the Cold War the assumption by the two blocs was
that the internal structure of states was believed to be a critical element of world
peace, yet only after 1990 did this have practical consequences. Intervention has now
become to some extent legitimate. Prevention as a strategy is, however fraught with a
number of dilemmas. It seems to be a revised version of a collective security system
which may, ironically, favour a renewed polarisation in the international system as it
will in the end remain a selective policy pursued either unilaterally or multilaterally.
It also remains unclear whether such a strategy to democratise the world will find the
required support in the respective democracies who will have to carry the heaviest
burden. Whether prevention is a form of – unintended or not – organised hypocrisy
is therefore a legitimate question that this article poses.
War and International Order
Charles Tilly2 described war making and state making in Europe as a form of
organised crime. Whether one agrees or not with the analogy, the final result
was the emergence of the European territorial states or what is commonly
called the Westphalian system. That system rested and still does on the normative
foundations of sovereignty institutionalising what some call an anarchic self-help
1. The original ideas for this article were developed for the panel on Sovereignty, Intervention and
Prevention for the IPSA 2003 in Durban. We wish to acknowledge the pertinent comments by the pane-
lists, Sven Chojnacki, and two anonymous reviewers.
2. Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in: P. B. Evans,
D. Rueschemeyer and T. Sckocpol (eds.): Bringing the State Back (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), pp. 169–191; see also Charles Tilly (ed.), Coercion, Capital, and European States. (Cambridge
MA: Basic Blackwell, 1990).
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system among the legally sovereign states. Internally, in contrast, the monopoly of
violence was eventually accomplished, guaranteed by the principle of internal
sovereignty legitimising those exercising this monopoly. The non-intervention
principle, or what is called Westphalian sovereignty, kept the two domains, the
external and the internal completely separated, at least in theory. This was gener-
ally accepted for good reasons since externally, for centuries the legitimacy of
waging war was undisputed3, while internally, in contrast, the illegitimate use
of force was prosecuted as a crime.
The behaviour of the sovereign states, the major powers in particular, did not
correspond to this idealised world of sovereign states. Yet it was not a world
without order in terms of commonly agreed upon norms and rules. Historically,
however, several international orders, each one resulting from major power
wars, as Holsti4 has shown, followed each other. The notion of order revolved
around the problem of war and peace. The first attack on the uncontested legiti-
macy of war was launched by Henri Dunant with the creation of the Red Cross.
The idea behind this was simple: if war can not be abolished it should at least
be humanised. That idea has been written down in the first Geneva Convention
of 1864, followed by the two Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907. Whereas the
Geneva Convention concerned the wounded soldiers and prisoners of war the
Hague Law of War tried to regulate the rules of combat. The League of Nations
was a first attempt at establishing a collective security system based on the
Wilsonian vision that democratic states do not wage wars against one another.
That idea was reinforced by the Briand-Kellog Pact banning war. This vision of
order never materialised and had to be buried on the battlefields of the Second
World War. A new effort was undertaken to ban the use of force with the
Charter of the United Nations while at the same time creating the institutional
mechanisms to sanction those states violating the principle of non-violent conflict
resolution. This vision quickly became obsolete with the outbreak of the ColdWar.
Nevertheless two aspects are worth pointing to: first of all attempts to banish
collective interstate violence is already a more than century old tradition,
seeking thereby to put some limits to the exercise of sovereign power. And
second the collective understanding of internal sovereignty changed from being
an attribute of the ruler to one of the people.5 The core proposition of the following
analysis is that the concept of prevention embodies both a vision of world order
where collective violence is absent and a strategy on how to achieve this desirable
goal. Intervention, in contrast, is the means whereby this strategy may be imple-
mented. This entails new practices concerning the principle of non-intervention.
In other words, if taken seriously, prevention inevitably will lead to a revision
of internal sovereignty from a right of the rulers to a right of the people guaran-
teed by the international community of states. As a consequence the Westphalian
principle no longer would be the normative justification for states to stand aside
when internal violence breaks out. We suggest that a fundamental change in the
collective understanding concerning the use of force is under way. The question
therefore is whether, from a theoretical perspective, the very concept of prevention
3. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War, Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4. Ibid.
5. Samuel J. Barkin, and Bruce Cronin, “The state and the nation: changing norms and the rules of
sovereignty in international relations”. International Organization Vol. 48, No. 1 (1994), pp. 107–130.
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as a very ambitious project of international order may either be just what it is or,
even worse, lead to a new kind of polarisation in the international system thereby
producing counterintuitive if not perverse effects.
First we will elaborate the meaning of intervention and prevention which are
often used almost interchangeably in order to avoid any semantic confusion.
We will then take up the issue of international order to which prevention is sup-
posed to contribute. We will then briefly address the changes of the international
order and sovereignty by referring to the continuities and discontinuities since
1945. The article will conclude by describing the dilemmas prevention, as a strat-
egy of creating or recreating international order entails. Whether it will ever be
effective, is one problem. The other is that this particular approach contributes
to a reconstruction of sovereignty, in particular by establishing the link between
internal and external sovereignty. The conclusion is that the final result is a poss-
ibly unintended form of organised hypocrisy.
Intervention and Prevention: Conceptual Clarification
Prevention6 as it seems to be understood presently is conceived not just as a strat-
egy to avoid armed conflict or terminate fighting; prevention seems rather to be
understood as a realistic strategy to contribute both in the short term as well as
in the long run to an international order where collective violence both between
and within states is no longer considered acceptable. If that is the case the impli-
cations are far reaching for both theory and practice in international politics. First
of all, subscribing to such a policy of prevention implies the collective obligation
of all states to abstain from the use of force. This implies, second, that preventing the
use of force itself becomes a collective obligation of the states. That has, thirdly,
consequences for the institution of sovereignty if the use of force itself is
interpreted more broadly by including not only international but also non-
international armed conflict7: the principle of non-intervention may turn into an
obligation to intervene. The paradoxical effect is that such an international order
not only legitimises the use of force under certain conditions but also makes it
an obligation. This, in turn, has consequences for sovereignty in general, the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in particular8.
6. There is an extensive literature on prevention. Our ambition is not to do such a review. We there-
fore just refer to a few publications we consider pertinent for that particular research field. Chester
A.Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, (eds.), Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing inter-
national conflict. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2003,. Carnegie Commission on Prevent-
ing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report. (New York: Carnegie Corporation of
New York, 1997). Janie Leatherman, William DeMars,/Patrick Gaffney and Raimo Va¨yrynen, Breaking
Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises. (West Hartford, CT: The Kumarian Press, 1999).
Robert I. Rotberg, (ed.), Vigilance and Vengeance. NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies.
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press). See also the article by Raimo Va¨yrynen in this
issue.
7. To use the terminology of the two additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions
8. Bertrand Badie, Un monde sans souverainete´. (Paris : Fayard, 1999); C.Lyons,, M. Mastanduno,
Beyond Westphalia. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Thomas Biersteker, and
Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as a Social Construct. (Cambridge MA: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); R. B. J Walker,., S. H Mendlowitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties. (Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1990)
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The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in
its report “The responsibility to protect” devotes its third chapter to “The Respon-
sibility to prevent”.9 The report is not only indicative of a fundamental change. It
postulates that prevention (and intervention) are no longer at the discretion of
individual states but an obligation of the governments towards their people
who have a right to be protected from violence of all sorts.10 At the same time
the Commission converts the more diffuse notion of prevention as practised by
diplomacy into a clear set of prescriptions or what it calls “commitment” for col-
lective state behaviour. Scientific notions of prevention converge with the practical
ones: it is not just a short-term activity but rather implies also “. . . to address . . .
the root causes of problems . . .”11 in the longer-term. The authors were aware
that by envisaging this strategy they are issuing a serious challenge to the existing
international order. They therefore cautioned that preventive action in general,
military intervention in particular, can and should only be practised as an excep-
tional and extraordinary measure, guided by precautionary principles and legiti-
mised by the right authority.12
Clearly short-term preventive action is, if force is used, identical with (military)
intervention. Intended to establish or re-establish domestic order with the aim to
reduce or eliminate the risks of regional or international turmoil, it violates the
principle of non-intervention itself. If the international community takes preven-
tive action it thereby suspends temporarily the state’s sovereign status because of
its demonstrated inability to deal with the situation it has to face. If intervention is
successful its status as a sovereign state will be restored. Looking at intervention
from this coercive perspective, one becomes immediately aware that the practice
is in fact synonymous with prevention. This conceptual fuzziness is due to the fact
that prevention is the – a priori undefined – strategy for a desired type of collec-
tive action intended to restore stability and order. Intervention is an element of
prevention in that it is the means through which prevention is actually
implemented.
We therefore define prevention as a comprehensive strategy of action, intended to
avoid or overcome the use of collective violence in the short term, intended to
eliminate the root-causes of collective violence in the longer run. The former is
usually called operative prevention, the latter structural prevention.13 Prevention
is therefore a prescription for collective action under clearly specified conditions
and legitimised by the community of states at large in order to sanction behaviour
by governments or parties in armed conflicts which would otherwise be con-
sidered unacceptable. This strategy has consequences in terms of the capacity to
9. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) The Responsibility to
Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Ottawa, 2001).
Several years earlier, the Aspen Institute Conference had already established the linkage between pre-
vention and intervention: Aspen Institute, Report of the Aspen Institute Conference: Managing Conflict in
the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention. (Aspen CO, August 2–6, 1995), in particular pp. 5–7.
See also in the same publication the contributions by Sahnoun and Urquart.
10. It is clear that Boutros-Ghali’s report has been the starting point for that discussion, triggered by
the Kurdish Refugee crisis during the Iraq war. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. (Report of
the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security
Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992).
11. ICISS, op. cit., p. 19.
12. Ibid.
13. See the summary in the article by Raimo Va¨yrynnen in this issue.
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act.14 It requires not only an efficient early warning capacity but requires also a
blueprint for the efficient means required such as military and civilian personnel
and also various non-governmental organisations (NGOs).15 Intervention, in
contrast, refers to the various means used in preventive actions imposed from
abroad and interfering in the external or internal affairs of a state. Analytically
one can therefore make a distinction between coercive intervention which
implies the use of force, and supportive intervention,16 the latter being but the
trivial consequence of the increasing interdependence between the great
number and variety of actors in the present international arena. An IMF or a
World Bank initiative falls into this category17 just as the multiple interactions
which take place between states inside the European Union.18 Nonetheless suppor-
tive intervention in contrast to coercive intervention is based on the agreement of
the state where third parties (states or international organisations) interfere.
That agreement may nevertheless not be fully consensual in the sense that the
intervening actors can couple their activities with a number of conditions which
is usually the case. In other words, supportive intervention does not exclude
that the intervener imposes his or her will to a certain degree. Ironically, supportive
intervention is not only considered to be legitimate but also desirable (develop-
ment aid etc.). Even more striking is the fact that those countries extremely
hostile to coercive intervention are those that postulate an obligation of the inter-
national community for supportive intervention. This is particularly true of
African states.19
There are however, more fundamental differences between the two forms of
intervention. Coercive intervention is predicated upon the vision of a world order
in which individual sovereignty is subsumed under the collective responsibility
to prevent violent conflict from breaking out, to prevent the escalation of violence,
and once the fighting has ended, to prevent the renewed eruption of collective
violence. As such it implies a fairly limited view of world order, where the use
of force is excluded. It falls within the responsibility of the international commu-
nity to intervene inside a deficient society for containing the risk of a potential con-
flict or rectifying a domestic order, which jeopardises regional or international
peace as prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. But until recently
14. We disregard at this point the issue of the willingness to act.
15. See in greater detail Gary King,, and Langche Zeng,, Improving Forecasts of State Failure;World
Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July, 2001), pp. 623–658 or Heinz Krummenacher and, Susanne Schmeidl, Prac-
tical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict. FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning Method-
ology. (Swisspeace, Working Paper 34, 2001). We cannot go into the specific issue of the role of so-called
civil society actors (NGOs). For an highly optimistic view see Pamela Aall, “What do NGOs Bring to
Peacemaking?” in: Ch. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds.), Turbulent peace: the challenges of
managing international conflict. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2003, pp. 365–383.
16. Some authors, such as Ernst-Otto Czempiel,, “U¨ber Interdependenz und Intervention”, Merkur
Vol. 54, No. 1, (2000), pp. 11–23 even argue that intervention is a necessity. It is the proper approach
to contribute to the democratisation of societies. This does not mean that Czempiel is arguing in
favour of military intervention, which in fact he rejects.
17. cf. Jackson, Robert H., Quasi-States, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and C. Thomas and P. Wilkin (eds.), Globalization
and the South. (London: Macmillan, 1996).
18. ,L,Hoogh Cohesion Policy and European Integration. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996);
A. Sbragia, (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policy-making in the new European Community. (Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992).
19. Ghazam Salame´,, Appel d’Empire. (Paris: Fayard, 1995).
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internal conflict was not considered as a threat to international peace and stability.
That has changed beginning with what later turned out to be a disaster: Somalia!
Supportive intervention, in contrast, is generally postulated to be an obligation of
the wealthier states to support the less wealthy ones. One could also call it inter-
national solidarity in general. That presupposes a minimal consensus between the
interveners and the intervened upon states. This kind of action therefore does not
seem to challenge the existing institution of sovereignty as the intervention in the
internal affairs of the states is perceived as an obligation on the one hand and as
desired on the other. Yet this conclusion is premature if one puts it into perspective
with prevention as an overarching strategy to establish andmaintain international
order.
Combining strategy (prevention) and means (intervention) we get the two-by-
two Table 1. For our present discussion the link between short term prevention
and coercive intervention with long-term prevention and supportive intervention
are critical for our discussion. The short-term coercive intervention-prevention
nexus implies the disregard of Westphalian sovereignty. The long term supportive
intervention-prevention coupling is a promise in that it presupposes that it will
actually succeed. If it does, then the classical Westphalian sovereignty will be
restored. Short-term supportive intervention-prevention which is actually prac-
tised inter alia systematically by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) (that is in the Baltic States and in Georgia among others) is
unproblematic from the presently prevailing sovereignty perspective.20 The
long term coercive prevention-intervention combination, in contrast, is ill
defined. If one takes the food for oil programme as an example, then it shows
that this kind of approach is bound to fail. One of the reasons is that sanctions,
whatever the intention that may be behind them, are unlikely to succeed as
those imposing the sanctions do not control the adaptive strategies of the
country actually being the target. Saddam Hussein’s case is revealing.
Prevention defined as a strategy and intervention as the means to implement
that strategy turned out to be a very ambitious concept for achieving a very
specific type of international order: one where both collective violence within
and between states is either punished or actually prevented from breaking out.
The short-term aspirations embedded in the concept focus primarily on the use
of force, the longer-term aspirations focus primarily on the structure of the
Table 1. Linking Prevention and Intervention.
Prevention: The Strategy
Time horizon
Short term Long term
Intervention: The means
Coercive e.g. Military Intervention e.g. Economic Embargo
Supportive e.g. Fact finding missions e.g. Aid
20. For that particular aspect see Terrence P. Hopmann,, “An Evaluation of the OSCE’s Role in Con-
flict Management”, in: H. Ga¨rtner, A. Hyde-Price and E. Reiter (eds.), Europe’s New Security Challenges.
(Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 219–54. These supportive short-term interven-
tions can for all practical purposes last for a prolonged period of time.
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states likely to guarantee the absence of the use of force. The type of order envi-
saged has major consequences for sovereignty which simultaneously prescribes
and proscribes state practices. We will briefly raise the issue of international
order before analysing its relationship with the institution of sovereignty.
International Order
The core of prevention is the avoidance of the use of force. The great 19th century
theoretician on war, von Clausewitz, postulated war (the use of force between
states) to be the simple continuation of politics by other means, not an end in
itself. This was the rationale behind state practice, initially of the European
interstate-system, but more than two hundred years ago, some states learned that
war does not pay. These states, the Benelux and Scandinavia, formed what Karl
Deutsch has called pluralistic security communities where, among others, the
long-term expectation prevailed that the use of force would be excluded in the con-
flicts opposing the states being members of the respective community.21 Other
states, however, in particular the great powers did not draw the same conclusion.
Holsti22 attributes to the legitimacy of the use of force, that is war, a central role
in the international order and in its changes. As he has shown major power wars
in particular not only had a destructive effect but also the consequence that when
they had ended a new order was constructed.23 Before elaborating this specific
proposition we will first refer briefly to the three dimensions of order which are
implicitly contained in his list of eight elements to characterise international
order. These three dimensions are legitimacy (or the normative aspect), means
(the behavioural aspect), and vision (the conceptual aspect). Legitimacy includes
a system of governance, assimilation and self-determination, and consensus on
war; means encompass a deterrence system, conflict resolution mechanisms,
and procedures for peaceful change; whereas vision refers to the anticipation of
future problems.
The first dimension – legitimacy - refers to the degree to which specific norms
and principles are collectively accepted. Assimilation refers to the particular post-
war situation with respect to the losers but in the age of globalisation assimilation
could be enlarged so as to include all states profiting from the expected welfare
benefits. With the end of the Cold War the principle of self-determination has
clearly revealed its potentially disruptive effect in that a number of states
claimed this right which is closely related to the declared goal of democratisa-
tion.24 The final element concerns the consensus on war. Is it considered legitimate
21. cf. Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organiz-
ation in the Light of Historical Experience. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security communities in theoretical perspective”, in: E. Adler
and M. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 3–28
22. Holsti, op. cit., chapter 11.
23. Holsti lists the particular peace treaties of Osnabru¨ck and Mu¨nster 1648, the Treaties of Utrecht
1711, Vienna 1814–15, Versailles 1919 and San Francisco 1945.
24. Of particular interest is the analysis by Christoph Zu¨rcher (with Jan Ko¨hler), “Introduction:
Potentials of disorder in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia”, in: Ch. Zu¨rcher (with Jan Ko¨hler) (eds.), Poten-
tials of Disorder. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 1–22 who argues that the system
of ethno-federalism in the former USSR and Yugoslavia contributed to some extent to this wave of new
states.
Prevention and Sovereignty 7
or not? Since 1945, war or armed conflict is no longer a legitimate means of conflict
resolution in the international system, at least in principle.
The dimension of the means includes those instruments collectively agreed
upon and therefore accepted as legitimate. These can be derived from what
Holsti calls a deterrence system or a normative framework prescribing and pro-
scribing the behaviour of its members. As a consequence this would include
both positive and negative sanctions mechanisms. The aim is to allow for conflict
resolution mechanisms and procedures promising peaceful change.
The normative and the instrumental dimension or order finally are complemen-
ted by the third one which we have called vision or what Holsti calls the antici-
pation of future problems. The necessity to anticipate future developments is
incontestable. In some areas this activity is institutionalised in the international
system, as is the case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Global Climate
Change. In this example longer term developments are to a certain degree predict-
able. In other areas, in particular with respect to internal and international crises
and armed conflict, activities concerning the occurrence of these kinds of events
are neither well institutionalised nor accurately predictable.25 Vision could there-
fore be defined in more general terms as the institutional structures required to
achieving the desired state of affairs which is the absence of collective violence.
But not just that: it presupposes that – internal and external – collective violence
as the central future problem in the international system is to some extent predict-
able and can therefore be avoided both in the short and in the long run. And
should it break out, it can be aborted.
That means that an international order as envisaged by prevention as a general
strategy not only directly affects the institution of sovereignty but also requires –
once more – new practices which mean the change of the institution of sover-
eignty itself. Holsti’s limited assumption that major power war is the decisive
agent for a change of international order needs also to be amended. As the break-
down of the Soviet Empire has shown, a change of international order can also be
brought about in the absence of this kind of war. Wewill argue next that the peace-
ful changes in the collective understanding of sovereignty which prevention
implies have unintentionally started during the Cold War period.
Sovereignty
Empirically, one could describe the international system over time by analysing in
detail the compliance or non-compliance with the norms legitimising state beha-
viour, that is the coherence between sovereignty as a set of norms and the practices
of the states. Krasner has introduced the distinction between the endurance of an
institution and its level of institutionalisation that is the conformity between
norms and practice.26 In the case of sovereignty Krasner draws the conclusion
that as theory and practice were never fully matched, sovereignty is nothing
but a form of organised hypocrisy. Organised hypocrisy is the outcome of the
tension between norms and practice that is an order based on the prohibition of
25. Predictability has to be distinguished from early warning. The latter seems to be easier to
achieve.
26. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999), pp. 56–58.
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the intervention in the domestic affairs of states and actual intervention. It is a
well-established fact that third party armed interventions in the internal affairs
of states have occurred repeatedly throughout history, even during the Cold War!
There are two problems with Krasner’s argument. First, as Legro27 shows in
the case of the laws of war by the different parties in the Second World War
there might be plausible reasons why actors violate a specific norm without
by the same token rejecting the normative framework as such. In addition, as
Hongju Koh28 shows, there may be competing norms and different procedures
as how to resolve the tensions existing among them. Second, Krasner does not
seem to take into account the possibility of norm change. Bierstecker, among
others, notes that the meaning of sovereignty will change according to the
practices of states29 or as Barkin and Cronin argue, sovereignty is not a par-
ameter but a variable.30 Therefore the hypocrisy statement, as plausible as it
may resonate in the first place, is misplaced. If all actors were hypocrites at
the same time, the argument would be incoherent and meaningless; if there
are some hypocrites that would mean that most of the others are not, the hypo-
critical cases being deviations from the norms31; finally norm change logically
presupposes hypocrites, but the designation as innovators would probably be
more adequate!
The question then becomes what the relevant dimensions of sovereignty are
that prevention as a strategy directly affects? Krasner32 identified four different
dimensions of sovereignty, the first of which is external sovereignty in terms of
Westphalian sovereignty, based on the notion of non-intervention. Legal sover-
eignty, on the other hand, is based on the recognition of states by others, reflecting
the norm of formal equality. His third dimension, interdependence sovereignty,
falls outside his classification scheme as it is empirically and not normatively
defined.33 The fourth element is internal sovereignty which refers to the two con-
ditions that are postulated to be satisfied: the monopoly of power and control over
a given territory and a people. We will first discuss briefly the two elements con-
cerning the external dimension of sovereignty, legal and Westphalian.
Sovereignty is a social construct; therefore it leaves room for different interpret-
ations which change over time.34 Legal sovereignty is the first relevant element:
the existing states in the international system recognise a new member as equal
27. See in particular Jeffrey W. Legro,, “Which norms matter? Revisiting the ‘failure’ of internation-
alism”. International Organisation, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31–63 who shows why the law of war was
respected in some cases and why not in others.
28. Harold Hongju Koh,, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106
(1997), pp. 2599–2659.
29. Thomas J. Bierstecker,, “State, Sovereignty and Territory”, in: W. Carlsnaes,, Thomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, (London: Sage. 2003), pp. 157–176.
30. Barkin and Cronin, 1994, op. cit.
31. We owe this argument one of the two anonymous reviewers, for which we are grateful.
32. Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999). See in particular his chapters 3 and 4.
33. Krasner actually dropped that fourth dimension in his recent article: Stephen D.Krasner,,
“Sharing Sovereignty New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States”. International Security, Vol.
29, No. 2 (2004), pp. 85–120.
34. Biersteker/Weber, 1996; op. cit. See also Cronin for a more recent discussion of the changes that
are underway: Bruce Cronin,, “Changing Norms of Sovereignty andMultilateral Intervention”, in F. O.
Hampson and D. Malone (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention – Opportunities for the UN System.
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 159–80.
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who endow the newcomer with rights and obligations. Legal sovereignty means
being accepted as equal among equals in the international system. The condition
is that the regime controls a territory and the people living within its borders. The
understanding was, as Jackson35 argued, that each state was capable of maintain-
ing its autonomy and independence, which he calls positive sovereignty. This he
contrasts with negative sovereignty. This actually happened according to him
after 1945, with respect to the former colonies. In other words, there has been a
considerable reinterpretation or change in meaning of that particular dimension
of sovereignty in that the members of the international system of states guarantee
those states their sovereign status which are incapable of maintaining it alone and
provide them with the means to exercise their independent statehood indepen-
dently. Analytically speaking, then, legal sovereignty can be both limited to exter-
nal recognition which is a right of those recognising a new state as sovereign. But
it can also be re-interpreted as to imply an obligation of the states to guarantee this
status, once it has legally been achieved.
Whereas the legal dimension of sovereignty allows for two alternative interpre-
tations the Westphalian dimension of sovereignty seems to be immune from any
change. But analytically speaking Westphalian sovereignty is contingent upon the
meaning of internal sovereignty. During the Congress of Vienna this problem of
intervention came up and Austria argued in favour of intervention in order to
support the legitimate rulers, the ruling dynasties that is. This would then have
legitimised military intervention should revolutionary upheavals occur and
depose the ruling dynasty, an interpretation which Britain did not share. The
basic disagreement was indeed Metternich’s interpretation of internal sover-
eignty: the legitimacy of the ruler, not the people.
The international system is based on the territorial state as its central unit. The
basic ordering institution is sovereignty. If sovereignty is a social construct, which
is anything but a trivial statement in the first place, the question then is whether
and how this social construct changes and can be changed over time. Thomson36
has argued that irrespective of statements such as loss of sovereignty or control
states are still the exclusive actors legitimised and capable of defining the rules
of the game, that is setting the norms prescribing and proscribing their own beha-
viour as well as that of the non-state actors. This includes the possibility of giving
up some of their prerogatives derived from their sovereign status or delegating
some of them to international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation
or the International Criminal Court. Crucial to our discussion is whether the belief
emerges that the internal structure of the states is related to international order,
and if so, what the consequences are with respect to the Westphalian dimension
of sovereignty. If internal order is relevant for an international order based
on the prohibition of armed force this would necessarily put into question the
principle of non-intervention. Sovereignty could then in fact be reconstructed
socially through changed state practices.
Prevention as we have defined it, and will argue below, represents the concep-
tual tool for such a reconstruction of sovereignty in general, a changed interpre-
tation or meaning of Westphalian sovereignty in particular. Yet even if there is
35. Robert H.Jackson,, Quasi-States, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
36. Janice E. Thomson,, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between
Theory and Empirical Research”. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1995), pp. 213–233.
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no single logical argument against such a reinterpretation to allow for coercive
measures of the international community of states to enforce a minimum of
internal institutional conformity (that is a guarantee of basic human rights)
there are two specific problems that need to be resolved in the first place. First
of all a practical one: only a few states are capable of intervening forcefully in
the domestic affairs of a third state In other words, the general legitimisation of
coercive intervention might produce the unintended effect of legitimising any
action on the part of those states willing and capable to intervene.37 The unin-
tended effect could be the legitimisation of all kinds of major power intervention.
The second problem relates to the efficiency and effectiveness of military interven-
tion. Thus far, the record is anything but convincing. According to Doyle and
Sambanis38 military interventions may stop actual fighting in the short-run, but
success is limited. Iraq, for example, shows that intervention may encourage ter-
rorist activities which the military is incapable of handling. And as the case of
Afghanistan reveals reconstructing a new internal order seems to be an almost
helpless undertaking.39 We will postpone the further discussion and take it up
again when analysing the dilemmas of prevention.
The UN Security Council is well aware of this dilemma in that its resolutions
always refer to the threat to international peace and stability, the only legitimate
justification for such action either by the UN or by delegated power to a regional
organisation or a coalition of states. At the same time these resolutions always
stress that they do not challenge sovereignty. Yet publicly they are legitimised
as humanitarian or as a necessity to prevent gross human rights violations
which do not per se represent a threat to international peace and stability. Weiss
et al.40 argue that “[I]f sovereignty means that a national government sets policy
in its domestic jurisdiction, evolving international standards suggest that this
remains true as long as a national government adheres to international law”. In
other words neither the practice of internal sovereignty is at the discretion of
the rulers in power, nor does this preclude a priori the possibility of intervention.
Kofi Annan has stated the underlying logic of such a reinterpretation of
Westphalian, if not also, internal sovereignty:
“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined. . . .. States are
now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and
not vice versa. . . .. This developing international norm in favour of interven-
tion to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to
pose profound challenges to the international community. In some quar-
ters it will rouse distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But I believe on
balance we should welcome it.”41 (emphasis added)
37. One of the reasons is that only a few powerful states are capable of doing so. For the 1945–2003
period see Chojnacki, Sven, “Zum Formwandel bewaffneter Konflikte”, in: H. Mu¨nkler and
K. Malowitz(eds.), Krieg fu¨r Frieden? Die humanita¨re Intervention in der Diskussion. (Wiesbaden:
Wocheuschau Po´litik, pp. 73–99). See also his article in this issue.
38. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A theoretical and Quanti-
tative Analysis”. American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (December 2000), pp. 779–802.
39. See the excellent case studies in A.Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester (eds.) Nation-
Building Unraveled ? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomington, Kumarian Press, 2004).
40. Thomas G Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger Coate, The United Nations and Changing World
Politics. 4th edition, (Boulder: Westview, 2004), p. 18
41. Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, The Economist (September 18, 1999).
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Most noticeable in this statement by Annan is that governments are instruments of
the people who have specific rights whereas the government in power has primar-
ily obligations towards individuals. This specific line of arguments goes right to the
heart of the prevention issue with coercion as the ultimate means. The kind of
vision proposed by Kofi Annan presupposes three things simultaneously: a nor-
mative consensus concerning state practice, a convergence with respect to the
instrumental dimension and finally a convergence with respect to the vision of
world order his statement implies and thus, by implication, has institutional con-
sequences. That such an envisaged change is not such an abrupt change as it may
seem will be shown next.
The Cold War Order
This brings us back to the problem of international order. International order has
always been determined both by power and norms. Even though a substantial
part of the IR literature emphasises power and interests, both are, as we
contend, always grounded in some kind of normative frame of reference.42 At
the end of the Second World War, consistent with Holsti’s proposition that
major power wars were historically decisive points for the change of the existing
international order, the Charter of the United Nations was the blueprint for the
new emerging order in terms of the three constitutive elements – legitimacy,
means, and vision. The concept of order its creators had envisaged was simul-
taneously comprehensive and limited. It was comprehensive in that it envisaged
a collective security systemmanaged jointly by the victorious powers of the war to
prevent, once and for all, another world war. It was limited at the same time
because it excluded any reference to the domestic order of the states by emphasis-
ing the non-intervention principle. The evolution of the order that began to
emerge was fragmented and partial. It was only with the end of the Cold War
that new opportunities for building a truly global order seemed to be feasible.
The way that both scholars and practitioners define prevention seems to
suggest that it is the solution to accomplish what the Charter failed to consider:
namely establish the link between the international and intra-national order. We
contend that this is what the concept of prevention is trying to achieve at least con-
ceptually by including under its roof the partial orders that had been created
during the Cold War period. Whether these expectations are theoretically well
grounded will be elaborated only after having briefly described these partial
orders.
A Partial Security System
Competition and striving for security can be taken for granted as a basic property
of international politics. In that sense the Cold War order was not different from
the previous ones. It differed however fundamentally from the past on two
42. When speaking of norms that does not necessarily mean that they are morally acceptable to a
majority or even acceptable at all. Take the Nazis: their justification for their destructive war was legit-
imised by reference to the need for space and the preservation of the Aryan race. The present Bush
administration has a very specific vision of world order, a Pax Americana which claims to resolve
all the problems of the world.
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counts. First of all international competition was determined between two incom-
patible visions of internal order: communism in the East and democracy in the
West. Each of the two camps promised eternal peace once the superior
one would have won. And secondly, nuclear weapons precluded resort to
Clausewitz’s strategy of gaining superiority through force. Political reality there-
fore contributed to strengthening the non-intervention principle. Intervention by
members of one bloc in the other were therefore excluded.43 Did this exclude
interventions violating the non-intervention principle? The answer is no, as the
fundamental competition was between two mutually exclusive concepts of
social organisation. Therefore it was not necessarily hypocritical that intra-bloc
military interventions were considered to be legitimate such as in Hungary in
1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the intervention in the Dominican Republic
1965 or the – aborted – Bay of Pigs intervention by the USA in Cuba in 1961.
State practice was also coherent in that each of the blocs indirectly supported its
clients. This was consistent with the interests of both of the blocs as well as the
rulers or opponents of the smaller and weaker countries in the Southern Hemi-
sphere profiting from the competition in the Northern Hemisphere. Ironically
this had a stabilising effect which became clear when that ideologically motivated
support for their respective clients became largely obsolete. Thus, in terms of
security a partial order was institutionalised excluding the use of force in the
Northern Hemisphere. In terms of preventing armed conflict in the Northern
Hemisphere between the two blocs, collaboration became institutionalised with
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This institutiona-
lised process was based on the insight that collaboration between the antagonist
blocs was necessary in order to avoid armed conflict at any price. The charter,
interestingly enough, did however contain provisions which legitimised some
principles considered to be central in that competition such as free movement
of people and information, or, in more general terms, reference to some basic
human rights norms. And one can also argue that the support of the respective
clients in the South was also considered legitimate in terms of the extended com-
petition between the two blocs.
A Partial Order: Functional Multilateralism
Multilateralism inspired by the functionalist approach has been the response of
states to the increasing interdependence between them, making cooperation a
necessity in order to enhance their ability to protect and promote common goods
and maintain the welfare level of their own people.44 To manage the growing inter-
dependence the functional approach was systematically developed, both at the
global level (through the UN system) as well as in different forms at the regional
level.45 One could argue that it was predicated on two complementary expectations.
The first was a preventive function so to speak in that it was clear that the use of
armed force was no longer meaningful among the highly industrialised societies
43. Erich Weede, “Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes,
1962–1976”. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1989), pp. 7–17.
44. John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 42.
45. See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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and that therefore multilateral cooperation could reduce the likelihood of violent
conflict resolution. The second was that it thereby legitimised the imposition of
specific principles characteristic of the Western bloc, in particular in the economic
sphere. Another way to put this in the development domain is to point to an
implicit notion of long-term prevention by peace through development. In
general, a new practice was thereby institutionalised promising new ways of regu-
lating and new allocations. In sum one could argue that this reflected the function-
alist perspective of a Working Peace System envisaged by Mitrany.46
New Actors: Unforeseen Agents of Change
The considerable growth of nongovernmental actors after the Second World War
was an additional factor in the process in the construction of the international
order primarily due to their growth and functional differentiation. Their
number has grown from a few hundred to more than 50,000 today, active in
every conceivable area, be it human rights, development, education, environment,
peace building, and conflict prevention and so on. These non-governmental actors
in general have by now become complementary to states, challenging their prac-
tices, and fighting for the human rights among others. These actors are advocating
norms and principles that are not respected both within and between states,
thereby attempting to promote new global responsibilities. Given their own iden-
tities and their lack of military resources, they clearly are complementing activities
that fall within the long-term preventive action. This process is helped by new
communication facilities. NGOs and the mass media are more and more involved
in the early warning process, which leads to preventive actions, while a real div-
ision of labour is taking place in which private actors take part. Their role was
nonetheless, if effective at all, mainly within the own power bloc and its sphere
of influence. A good example of this is the study by Sikkink47 on the issue of
the vanished prisoners in Argentina and Mexico. They established this particular
linkage between the international realm and the internal domain. Again, as a
specific Western development they naturally contributed to the dissemination
of Western principles. In the Eastern Bloc this led to the emulation of the
Western NGO model, in particular in the human rights domain (i.e. Charter 77
in Czechoslovakia, the Helsinki groups among others in Poland, the Soviet
Union or Yugoslavia). They thereby began to question the principle of internal
sovereignty of their targeted states where foreign states could not openly inter-
vene. In that respect this power competition strengthened and legitimised their
presence in the international arena.48
The preliminary conclusion is that one can indeed interpret the ColdWar period
as one where both short-term and long-term prevention had already become a
constitutive part of state practice without being semantically subsumed under
that particular concept. First, the short-term approach was practised more or
less by default between East and West. Second, the longer-term approach was
46. David Mitrany, AWorking Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966)
47. Kathryn A. Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin
America”. International Organisation Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), pp. 411–441
48. Richard Higgott, with Geoffrey Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds.), Non-State Actors and Auth-
ority in the Global System (London: Routledge, 2000).
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practised both at the global and regional levels along functional lines. This led to
partial orders in different issue areas. But in these partial orders, in particular in
the economic one, the West was capable of imposing its values because of the
weakness of the Communist bloc. The logic of this type of longer-term prevention,
primarily relying on what we called supportive intervention, was also dictated by
the competition among the two prevailing ideologies and their different visions of
internal social order. Naturally this was not framed in terms of a strategy of pre-
vention, yet that competition can indeed be interpreted this way.
Thus, if sovereignty as organised hypocrisy has ever been widely practised this
may be true of the Cold War period where the blocs deliberately used strategies
disregarding Westphalian sovereignty on the basis of a more or less tacit consen-
sus among them. Two properties this process entailed were on the one hand that
supportive intervention became a well-established practice based upon the nor-
mative understanding of the obligation to support states in need. On the other
hand it also contributed to a changing perspective as to the role of the internal con-
ditions of the individual states even though these were seen primarily through the
restricted lens of power competition. This kind of intervention was thus a some-
what established practice by the end of the Cold War based on the notion that the
internal structures of the states would guarantee peace and stability in the end.
The Emerging Post-Cold War Order
The breakdown of the Soviet empire represents a fundamental change in the inter-
national system. It reinforced developments that have already been underway for
decades. Thus, from the prevention-intervention perspective we would argue that
there is more continuity than is usually assumed. This implies that changing state
practices are running counter to the prevailing understanding of sovereignty, in
particular the non-intervention principle. There are several reasons that facilitated
this development. First of all, with the East-West competition having become
obsolete, the various client states of the blocs lost the support of their patrons
with the exception of those still considered strategically central such as in the
Middle East. One of the consequences was that when a number of these client
states lost the external support their fragile base of legitimacy became apparent.
At the same time this created the space for various non-state actors to challenge
the governments in power, in a number of cases violently (e.g. Sierra Leone.). Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, violent internal conflicts were on the increase since
the mid-fifties reaching their peak in the early 1990s.49 One could possibly inter-
pret this as a correlation with the decreasing East-West tension during the Cold
War period. Fairly new and indeed increasing was the number of so-called sub-
state wars in weak or failed states or what has been called new wars even
though they were not that new either, as Chojnacki has shown.50 What was
new, however, was the response to these armed conflicts.
Internal violence had been steadily rising after the SecondWorldWar, but it had
not been a major preoccupation of the community of states at large. Things
49. Abschlussbericht zur Projektfo¨rderung. Mimeo, 2005. Available on request fromwolf.eberwein@
iep.upmf-grenoble.fr. It is the summary report (in German) of the research project on the evolution of
wars 1945–2003, specifying new types and the main identified trends.
50. See the listing by Chojnacki, op. cit. (forthcoming).
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changed dramatically after 1990. Whereas inter-state violence has vanished for the
time being,51 internal violence is today the dominant form of armed conflict. The
Weberian world had come under stress. As these states have lost their monopoly
of coercive means it seems evident to intervene in their domestic affairs in order to
restore a state that does not exist any more. A responsibility principle could be
invoked to replace the sovereignty principle, even if by default. As a review of
the sociological literature on violence suggests52 it can be interpreted on a larger
scale as the causal effect of a dramatic lack of internal and international social inte-
gration. These countries face the same problems that state-builders had to face in
Europe at the end of the 19th Century when a destabilising social protest was
fuelled by a strong shortage of national integration. This was the starting point
of the welfare state adventure, like the disseminated social violence is now boost-
ing a new programme for an international human security. This Durkheimian per-
spective in international relations is still hardly accepted by the state actors. The
changed, more permissive, context is most visible in terms of the activities of
the Security Council approving military interventions in internal armed conflicts
(e.g. Afghanistan and Bosnia). The UN itself became engaged in an unprece-
dented number of more or less robust interventions.53 And even if the Security
Council did not legitimise military intervention, as was the case with the
Kosovo in 1999 or Iraq in 2003, some states nevertheless went ahead.
The process of democratisation, a process that had already begun in the sev-
enties with Greece, Spain and Portugal, continued in the eighties in Latin
America and finally reached Africa in the nineties. The ‘victory of democracy’
over the ‘empire of the evil’ became almost a matter of fact with the expectation
that this would be the inevitable path all the states would want to take or could
possibly be forced to take. This opened or facilitated the legitimacy of coercive
interventions for the sake of peace, security and stability.
These new trends in the changing context finally converged into the idea that a
comprehensive strategy of prevention was the adequate response to recreate the
world order that had prevailed during the ColdWar. States had become more sen-
sitive, if not more vulnerable, to developments outside their own borders as
suggested many years ago by Keohane and Nye.54 This sensitivity, if not vulner-
ability, has two dimensions – a functional and a normative one. Functionally the
security and wealth of the states in the international system can no longer be guar-
anteed individually, not even by the most powerful states in light of the increasing
process of globalisation.55 Military power is limited in producing order and
51. Ibid, p. 5.
52. See M.Brown,, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 1996);
Ted R. Gurr,. (ed.), Peoples versus States. (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2000); Monty G Marshall
and Ted R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005. (Center for International Development and Conflict Manage-
ment. University of Maryland, College Park, 2005); R. B. J.Walker and S. HMendlowitz (eds.), Contend-
ing Sovereignties. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
53. For an overview and evaluation of UN-activities see Winrich Ku¨hne,,UN-Friedenseinsa¨tze in einer
Welt regionaler und globaler Sicherheitsrisiken – Entwicklungen, Probleme, Perspektiven. (Zentrum fu¨r Inter-
nationale Friedenseinsa¨tze Analyse 06/05, Berlin, 2005).
54. Robert O Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power and interdependence: World Politics in Transition.
(Boston MA: Little Brown. 3d. ed., 2001), pp. 7–11.
55. Bertrand Badie, L’impuissance de la puissance. Essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales. (Paris :
Fayard, 2004); see also Joseph S.Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power. Why Washington
Should Worry”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3 (2004), pp. 16–20.
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hardly adequate as a generalised means to establish and maintain stability. There-
fore the consequence is to pursue a strategy of reconstructing or strengthening
failed and weak states. In functional terms one could nevertheless argue that a
number of these failed or weak states are irrelevant and could therefore be isolated
from those that are highly interconnected.
But this would overlook the normative dimension which after the end of the
Cold War became much more important. That the states are sensitive to these
developments is reflected in the now prevalent concepts espoused by inter-
national organisations and individual states, in particular good governance or
human security.56 But the ‘democratic peace’ proposition has also played and
plays the role as an intellectual catalyst. It is irrelevant in a way whether that sen-
sitivity is based on purely instrumental reasons and rational calculations or on the
normative conviction that human rights violations or poverty are unacceptable.
That normative interdependence is a reality and transnational non-governmental
actors are reinforcing it through their activities. Their activities make governments
potentially vulnerable to their criticism These actors are a non-negligible com-
ponent in the whole process of norm emergence, diffusion and institutionali-
sation57 for this new world order where internal structures are more and more
emphasized as a necessary condition for peace and stability.
We suggest that the impact of international interdependence both in functional
and normative terms converges in the overarching strategy of prevention. That
includes both coercive and positive intervention and links a short-term with the
long-term perspective. This becomes evident when going through three docu-
ments published in the past years by three major actors in international politics:
the national strategy of the Bush administration, the second the European Security
Strategy, and third by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Report on “Investing in
Prevention” from the United Kingdom. These documents can be seen as an
attempt to overcome the confusion that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The unfounded expectations of the world becoming democratic overnight, and
therefore peaceful, based on a universal consensus either freely accepted or to
be enforced, where shattered.58 After the disaster in Somalia, followed by the
catastrophe in Rwanda, and finally culminating in destruction of the World
Trade Centre there was a convergence towards what we have called a comprehen-
sive strategy of prevention with a specific world order in mind. That can be found
in those three documents as divergent as they may be in a number of points.
The National Security Strategy of the Bush Jr administration clearly suggests
a comprehensive power-based approach59 based on a world order of strong
56. In fact, to our knowledge Rittberger from Tu¨bingen has mentioned this normative interdepen-
dence first when discussing the issue area “Herrschaft”. Volker Rittberger,, Internationale Organisatio-
nen, (Opladen: Leskeþ Budrich, 1995).
57. This analytical differentiation of the process is from Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink,
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4
(1998), pp. 891; see also R.Cohen,, International Politics: The Rules of the Game. (London: Lingmann,
1986); Mervyn,Frost, Ethics in International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
T. Nardin,, Law, Morality, and the Relation of States. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983);
John Ruggie, op. cit.
58. In fact the transition to democracy is accompanied empirically by a high probability of enduring
violent conflict.
59. TheWhite House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, D.C.:
The White House, 2002). See also the analysis by Delcourt and Va¨yrynnen in this issue.
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democratic territorial states. That strategy not only envisages short term interven-
tions of a coercive kind but also, as a necessary complement, a longer term posi-
tive intervention strategy intended to further democratic developments. The US
government “will make freedom and development of democratic institutions
the key themes in our bilateral relations . . . while we press governments that
deny human rights to move towards a better future”.60 At the same time it says
that “[W]hen violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with
friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability”.61 These are just
two citations to illustrate the argument that both a short and long term perspective
prevails. It also suggests that behind the concept is a vision of world order that can
be imposed on US terms!
The European Security Strategy62 and the Barcelona report that clarified it is
explicitly referring to a comprehensive prevention approach, including both
short-term coercive intervention as well as systematic long-term positive inter-
vention measures where poverty eradication and good governance stand out as
the ultimate goals. It is also revealing as an almost imperial concept as every
potentially relevant actor group is included: the military and police, non-govern-
mental organisations and individual volunteers from every area of activity (civi-
lian peace-building, development workers, emergency relief specialists etc.). The
declared intention is to make the civil society actors subcontractors of politics in
the name of conflict prevention.
The most sophisticated strategy of prevention has been worked out by the Strat-
egy Unit of the British Prime Minister.63 The report assumes that “instability and
crises are likely to be an enduring part of the international landscape for the fore-
seeable future”.64 As a logical corollary it simultaneously proposes a longer-term
strategy to reduce instability and a shorter-term crisis response capability. As the
report argues “there is a collective international responsibility to protect”.65 In
other words, governments are no longer autonomous in decidingwhether to inter-
vene in other countries nor are they fully autonomous in deciding how to use the
means of prevention. As different as these strategy documents are, they converge
on a specific understanding of international order. Irrespective of whether or not
the actual propositions are put into action, they all share a basic understanding
how this new world order should look and even how this could be implemented.
In terms of the legitimacy dimension of world order all these reports suggest a
system of governance which necessarily includes both the international as well as
the national level. The former built on cooperation and excluding the use of force,
the latter built on a more or less democratic type of domestic order where the
minimum is the respect for basic individual human rights contributing to
the elimination of violent conflicts. As far as the means are concerned there is
60. Ibid., p. 4.
61. Ibid, p. 9.
62. Xavier Solana,, European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World. (Brussels: The
European Institute for Security Studies, 12 December 2003); Barcelona Report of the Study Group on
Europe’s Security Capabilities: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. (Barcelona, 15 September 2004).
See also the analysis by Jaap De Wilde in this issue.
63. PrimeMinister’s Strategy Unit, Investing in Prevention. An International Strategy to Manage Risks of
Instability and Improve Crisis Response. (London, February 2005).
64. Ibid, p. 3.
65. Ibid., p. 4.
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the expressed willingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of states, in the
short-run through coercive means if necessary, through adequate measures to
strengthen the institutions of these critical states in the long run.
The vision is a kind of ‘democratic peace’ – an international state system com-
posed of sovereign states. But to get there implies, and that is our main argument,
changed state practices that imply a changing construction of sovereignty.
According to this vision the preservation if not restoration of sovereignty is
centred on the individual and the ‘responsibility to protect’ basic rights of the indi-
viduals. This is at least conceptually a fundamental change of both the under-
standing of the internal dimension of sovereignty as well as far as the
Westphalian principle is concerned. Changed practices presuppose by definition
that they are preceded by an intellectual reorientation that is the reconstruction of
reality. Prevention serves that purpose. The question then remains whether such a
vision of world order is not just another intellectual pious hope.
The Dilemmas of Prevention
As Krasner observed, the states are damned if they intervene, and damned if they
do not.66 This statement reflects but one aspect of the dilemmas the postulated
strategy of prevention raises. Prevention with both coercive and supportive inter-
vention presupposes new forms of policies and practices. A shorter-term pers-
pective requires an efficient early warning system allowing the international
community, and especially the international actors who take over this role on its
behalf, to derive and take the necessary measures. The early warning process
should prompt the diplomatic actors to focus on domestic issues in third countries
rather than concentrate primarily on international concerns in order to determine
whether a situation requires preventive action. Evaluating the risks and the costs
of such an investment they need to obtain good information and be protected from
the risks of manipulation stemming from the suspected societies as well as from
abroad. It also implies the capacity and willingness to act and from there the
coordination among all the potentially intervening actors who might simul-
taneously be in a competitive Hobbesian relationship. The longer-term perspec-
tive is also fraught with problems. First of all it requires adequate knowledge as
to the longer-term effects of supportive intervention measures. Second, it requires
the adequate resources to implement the measures considered to be necessary.
Third, it requires the willingness to implement these measures. Fourth it presup-
poses that the authorities in the intervening countries are willing and capable to
support that process. Each of these conditions is easily formulated; whether all
of them can be satisfied simultaneously is questionable. We will frame these pro-
blems in terms of six dilemmas that prevention as a strategy of a collective human
security entails. Each of them relates to at least one of the three dimensions of
international order if not two. In addition, one has also to take into account the
internal support governments need (or which might force them to act) in order
to purse a consistent prevention strategy, in particular with respect to short-
term coercive and long term supportive means.
Dilemma 1: Whatever prevention intends to achieve, it can only be implemented
in the real international system which is still asymmetric in terms of power
66. Krasner, 2004, op. cit., p. 94.
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distribution. Major powers with different interests prevail. Even though the prob-
ability of nuclear war among them is close to zero the present institutional struc-
tures in general, the Security Council of the UN in particular, can only function
properly if the a priori consensus among them could be taken for granted. This
is not the case. The new major power configuration forecloses such a consensus.
At the same time major powers will not accept any intervention that does not
fit their interests. Neither the PRC (Tibet) nor Russia (Chechnia) accept any inter-
vention in their own affairs. Thus if practised by only a number of states capable of
implementing that strategy of prevention may have the unintended effect of nur-
turing a renewed type of power competition for spheres of influence. Thus power
is the potential barrier not only with respect to the legitimacy of prevention but
also in terms of the visionary dimension of that strategy.
Dilemma 2: long-term prevention aims to regulate international disorder and
reduce the risks of potential violence. This implies the active involvement of
one or several foreign states for an indeterminate duration in those states where
they are intended to intervene as investigators and as brokers among the conflict-
ing parties. The intervening states have to be credible as state-rebuilders. Yet the
higher the visibility of the intervention activity, the higher the risk is for the inter-
vening power to be suspected of pursuing goals in its own interest. As a conse-
quence this is likely to generate new frustrations and produce new sources of
tension in those states and also in the international system. Iraq comes close to
the ideal type to illustrate this general proposition. The declared goal of the US,
to eliminate the danger of Iraq building weapons of mass destruction and to
democratise the country has not only lost all credibility but has also nurtured
new conflicts within the country and in the region. The desired pacifying effect
has not been achieved. Short-term intervention can also lead to new sovereignty
claims among the frustrated groups in the population. A similar situation may
arise in the case of longer-term supportive interventions. The more obvious and
visible the intervention is the likelihood increases that long-term intervention
may be denounced as some kind of postcolonial syndrome. IMF structural adjust-
ment plans, for example, that have now become more and more customary may
indeed create resistance to that strategy. Thus, a necessary condition for preven-
tion (short or long term) to be successful requires that the different political
groups where third parties are intervening consider these interventions collec-
tively as legitimate. In a potentially violence prone society or in a society where
violence had occurred that condition is unlikely to be satisfied. A sufficient con-
dition is that the means used are effective and sufficient. That condition as well
is unlikely to be satisfied as the reluctance of the states to raise their expenditures
for development aid to the 0.7 per cent of their GDP shows.
Dilemma 3: Prevention as a strategy presupposes that if short-term non-coercive
measures fail, then short-term coercive measures will follow. In other words the
earlier such measures are taken, the less visible, the less costly and the less
risky they are as violence has not yet broken out. This presupposes a good early
warning intelligence system that actually leads to early reactions. As the case of
the US shows, the knowledge about the attack of the World Trade Centre was
available but ignored. That is a lack of institutional capacity for reaction. But
the lack of willingness may also come into play, independently or jointly. The gen-
ocide in Rwanda is another illustration of that particular problem. The Clinton
administration simply refused to take action even though the information was
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there that the genocide would take place. The conclusion is that even if the means
of effective prevention are possibly better invested in pre-conflict situations this is
not thus far the preferred option. At the same time coercive intervention does not
necessarily follow if violence breaks out, and if that option is chosen it is much
more costly and the chances of failure are much higher, thereby contributing to
the loss of legitimacy of prevention.
Dilemma 4: For the same reasons, prevention is much more efficient and less costly
when it can be deployed in a context of weak social violence. But the weaker the
social violence, the less salient is the threat that could lead to preventive action.
The prevention policy runs the risk to be deemed excessive and unjustified by
parts of the international community and the population concerned. Whereas
this applies to the shorter term perspective the analogous problem prevails with
respect to long-term prevention. The link between population growth, urbanis-
ation, HIV/AIDS and resource scarcity has been well documented in the study
by Cincotta et al.67 in their report on The Security Demographic. Where these con-
ditions are simultaneously present the probability of violence rises. Thus, from
a longer-term perspective this knowledge should lead to a massive investment
in combating AIDS in particular in Africa. But that is not the case. It is unclear
whether this is in effect due to lacking capacities or the willingness to act. Para-
doxically then social violence may be easier to legitimise any kind of coercive
short term intervention even though more costly and risky whereas at the same
time reducing to practical irrelevance long term prevention as both a vision and
a legitimate strategy to create the envisaged world order. Long-term or positive
prevention is difficult to achieve because it implies a high mobilisation of
resources with an unknown return on investments. Functionally speaking,
however, prevention is much more efficient in the long term since it protects
against violence and its destructive effects. But this proposition which goes gen-
erally uncontested is still in need of hard empirical evidence which we do not
have. The promise of human security which is believed to be a good investment
for strengthening both national and international security is no more than that.
Dilemma 5: In principle multilateral prevention reduces the costs of intervention,
makes it more efficient, enhances its legitimacy, and makes the use of power more
widely acceptable. The appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-
General in a troubled region or even a selective policy of prevention, such as
small weapons disarmament in Salvador or Mozambique are clear evidence of
this efficiency. Multilateral prevention activities shorten at the same time the
rewards that the individual states expect to get from their own interventions.
But again power comes into play. Major powers in general, the US in particular,
do not seem to be willing to give the UN the means to perform with greater effi-
ciency and independence.68 Only under specific conditions can major power con-
sensus be achieved as was the case in the Iraq invasion and annexation of Kuwait.
Dilemma 6: Thus far we have not addressed the issue of popular support for any
government involved in short-term coercive interventions or in long-term suppor-
tive intervention. We will only touch briefly upon two aspects. First a majority of
the populationmaywant to see its government intervene to stop a genocide which
67. Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic – Popu-
lation and Civil Conflict After the Cold War. (Washington D. C.: Population Action International, 2003).
68. The so-called Brahimi Report is illuminating: UnitedNations (Brahimi Report), Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations (A/53/305-S2000/809). (accessed 15 June, 2004)
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the government will not. Second, a government may want to invest heavily in
long-term supportive interventions but it will not get the support because of
the internal economic conditions. In other words, both the capacity and the
willingness to act may depend on both popular support and the lack thereof.
One could put it that way: democracies trying to democratise the world may
well fail because they are democracies. Again, the legitimacy of prevention may
suffer, the vision that goes with it remain just that: a Kantian dream of a peaceful
world society.
Prevention: Organised Hypocrisy or a Viable Strategy for World Order?
Sovereignty, as a central institution of the international system, presupposes func-
tioning territorial states integrated both internally as well as externally. Prevention
is a kind of blueprint for building the newworld order intended to reduce if not to
eliminate the use of collective violence both within and between states. As we
have tried to show this requires a reinterpretation of sovereignty in particular
by establishing the linkage between internal and external sovereignty. At the
core is not only the obligation of states to abstain from the use of force between
them but also to abstain from using it against their citizens. This obligation
of the former corresponds to basic rights of the latter which the strategy of preven-
tion postulates as a generalised obligation of all states to act if the basic rights of a
specific population are violated. The idea as such is appealing in that by redefin-
ing internal sovereignty in the terms of a collective obligation of all states to pre-
serve it in a specific way necessarily leads to a qualification of the Westphalian
sovereignty principle: non-intervention still holds as long as internal sovereignty
prerogatives are not abused by the rulers. Consequently prevention intends to
maintain or re-establish strong territorial states some of which have already col-
lapsed. This envisaged change in terms of new legitimate state practices is hypo-
critical in Krasner’s terms in that existing state practices are challenged. It is
hypocritical if state practices relating to the different dimensions of sovereignty
are considered to be static, that is unchangeable. If however state practices
change, which has been the case throughout history, those states advocating
new practices may be considered hypocrites because they reject the prevailing
norms and principles. But one might better call them innovators. Short and
long-term prevention in combination with coercive and supportive intervention
does indeed represent, at least at the conceptual level, such an innovation if, as
we have shown, that strategy actually becomes common state practice, and thus
legitimate.
In the abstract these expectations are plausible. In the remainder we can but
offer a few speculative theoretical arguments as to why this highly appraised
strategy of establishing or re-establishing international order runs the risk of
becoming a kind of real organised hypocrisy. We would go even further by
arguing that under the present conditions prevention may become even the cata-
lyst for a new polarisation in the international system. Immediately after 1990
there seemed to emerge the necessary consensus among the major powers in
the Security Council of the United Nations that they have a collective responsibil-
ity to intervene in war-torn countries in which consensus has broken down. The
misnomer ‘war on terror’, coined after the murderous attack on the World
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Trade Center in New York, reflects this change. It is not a war but a mobilising
label. That war has become the central issue for the United States. But not only
the last military superpower but also others like the United Kingdom have
made of the fight against terrorism the unifying focal point of their security strat-
egies of which prevention is the constitutive component.
Whereas a consensus prevails that the fight against terrorism is central today,
that consensus evaporates quickly once it comes to agreeing who and where the
terrorists are. These conflicting interpretations will have different consequences
for action. But even if there is agreement as to the danger represented by specific
groups or specific states there is an additional source of potential disagreement
about the means to be employed. The fight against terror has indeed revealed dis-
agreement on both counts. The potential for a new kind of polarisation in the inter-
national system is very likely between those willing to fight evil and those who
will not. Short-term coercive intervention is therefore likely to be blocked at the
level of the United Nations Security Council which in turn provokes unilateralism
by either one or a few countries. This is then the best way to discredit prevention
as a strategy in general, short term coercive intervention and long-term supportive
intervention in particular. This may indeed justify in part the conclusion that pre-
vention used as a means to pursue individual national security interests lacking
support and legitimacy may indeed by hypocritical as the overall vision
embedded in the strategy of prevention is at best subsumed under specific
national interests.
But a more general argument can be made as well as to why prevention may be
hypocritical for two reasons. First of all, even disregarding the fact that only a
limited number of states have the means to intervene militarily in the short
term, the capacity to do so is relatively small compared to the violent conflicts
where intervention would be justified. But not only may the limited resources
prevent states from intervening but also rational calculations as to the probability
of success. This is, among others, stressed by the authors of the Barcelona Report
elaborating the European Security Strategy. Even though individual rationality
may suggest a policy of long-term prevention such an approach is unlikely to
be sustained if implemented at all. Second, even if such a strategy is chosen, it
may produce the perverse effect of nurturing rather than mitigating conflict in
the states where such a policy is practiced (Iraq is telling in this regard). Third,
the states themselves are responsible for the root causes of instability and frag-
mentation. At the same time there is neither consensus with respect to the
vision of preferred order nor do the states have the capacity required, even if
they were willing, to work towards a world order where collective violence
within and between states is absent.
What is feasible, however, is a selective short-term approach of prevention
whether legitimised or not. Some states may be willing to intervene militarily,
some may also consider this type of prevention as legitimate but it seems likely
that it will be evaluated according to the political power needs. The new monitor-
ing coming from the international public sphere, public opinion, media andNGOs
may contain these risks and reconstruct the prevention policy by reducing the
pressure of the dilemmas. But the expectations linked to a world order, in which
such a broad based approach to prevention seems to be futile. These expectations
are likely to be deceived: lacking the universal acceptance of the norm of inter-
vention, lacking the capacity for prevention, and finally lacking the willingness
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to intervene based on normative considerations alone the end result is that
prevention may turn out to be just another unintended form of organised
hypocrisy.
The willingness and capacity to invest in war-torn, weak or failed states are
definitely limited. This means that prevention as a strategy can only be pursued
on a selective basis which may indeed reinforce new lines of polarisation
among those who profit from that strategy and those who do not. And it seems
not out of reach that by the same token the UN will further be weakened. Quite
a different matter is whether our knowledge base is sufficiently solid to allow
for the design of a predictable outcome of programmes designed to contribute
to good governance, a functioning economy, an integrated social system and a
stable polity in the long run. Due to this necessary selectivity the final result
may indeed be to discredit the very concept itself. In that sense one could speak
of prevention as organised hypocrisy unless it can be shown that it is actually a
working type of collective security system intended to bring about eternal internal
and external peace in the international system. We fear that such a strategy is not
sustainable.
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